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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CHILD TESTI-
MONY VIA VIDEOTAPE OR CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION-DEFEND-
ANT'S RIGHT To CONFRONT WITNESSES--The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a statute allowing children to testify
outside the physical presence of a defendant by means of video-
tape or closed circuit television violates the defendant's constitu-
tional right to confront witnesses face-to-face. The court further
held that Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
requires a face-to-face confrontation between a defendant and a
witness, and allows exceptions only when the defendant has
previously had the opportunity to physically confront and cross-
examine the witness.
Commonwealth v. Louden, 638 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1994).
Helen Louden ("Wife") and her husband, Larry E. Louden, Sr.
("Husband") operated a day care center in their home.' The
home was a duplex, separated by a common party wall, and the
Husband's mother and step-father lived in the other half of the
duplex.2 Because the Husband's mother was ill, the Husband's
sister, Carol Wolfe, frequently visited the mother's half of the
house.! Not long after the Wife and Husband started their day
care center, Ms. Wolfe began hearing verbal threats and physi-
cal abuse directed at children attending the center.' In the fall
of 1986, Ms. Wolfe contacted several state agencies and the local
police department and informed them of the threats and abuse.5
When the authorities advised Ms. Wolfe that they could not act
1. Commonwealth v. Louden, 638 A.2d 953, 954 (Pa. 1994). The Wife received
certification by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to operate the day care center in
their home in July of 1986. Louden, 638 A.2d at 954.
2. Louden, 638 A-2d at 954.
3. Id.
4. Id. Ms. Wolfe heard these threats and abuses through the common party
wall. Id. The noises Ms. Wolfe heard included adults using obscene language and
directing threats at particular children, followed by smacking noises and children
crying and screaming. Id. At a later point, some children who attended the day care
center experienced nightmares and became withdrawn in the presence of adult
males. Id.
5. Id.
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until a parent complained or until one of the children was in-
jured, Ms. Wolfe took it upon herself to place a tape recorder in
the hallway of her mother's house when the noises were at their
loudest pitch.'
Based on Ms. Wolfe's recordings and independent police inves-
tigations, the police arrested the Wife and Husband for endan-
gering the welfare of children." The Commonwealth filed a pre-
trial motions seeking to have three child witnesses, ages seven
to nine, testify via videotape depositions pursuant to Section
5984 of the Child Victims and Witnesses Act (the "Act").9 The
6. Id.
7. Louden, 638 A.2d at 954. According to the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, a
person supervising the welfare of a child under the age of 18 commits a misdemean-
or of the first degree if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating
a duty of care, protection or support. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304 (1973 & Supp.
1994).
8. Louden, 638 A.2d at 954. The Wife and Husband also filed a pre-trial
motion to suppress Ms. Wolfe's tape recordings. Id. The trial court granted the mo-
tion based on the fact that the Wife and Husband had a reasonable expectation that
their conversations would not be recorded and the Commonwealth failed to prove
otherwise. Id. at 958. Also, the trial court held that the Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act protected the communications that occurred inside the Wife and
Husband's residence. Id. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701-26 (1978 & Supp. 1994) for
the codification of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. Section 5703 of
this act makes it a felony of the third degree to willfully intercept, disclose or use
any wire or oral communication. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (1978 & Supp. 1994).
See note 33 for disposition of the suppression issue.
9. Louden, 638 A.2d at 954. On February 21, 1986, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture enacted two provisions under the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act relating
to the testimony of a child victim or a child material witness. Id. at 955. The Act
states in part:
§ 5984. Videotaped depositions
(a) Depositions - In any prosecution involving a child victim or child
material witness, the court may, for good cause shown, order the taking
of a videotaped deposition of the victim or material witness on motion
of the child through his parent or guardian, or where applicable, the
child's advocate or the attorney for the Commonwealth. Such videotaped
depositions, if taken for use at the preliminary hearing, may be used
only at the preliminary hearing in lieu of the testimony of the child. If
such videotaped deposition is taken for use at trial, it may be used only
at the trial in lieu of the testimony of the child. The depositions shall
be taken before the court in chambers or in a special facility designed
for taking the depositions of children, Only the attorneys for the defend-
ant and for the Commonwealth, persons necessary to operate the equip-
ment, a qualified shorthand reporter and any person whose presence
would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child, including
persons designated under section 5983 (relating to rights and services),
may be present in the room with the child during his deposition. The
court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of
the child in person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see
the defendant. Examination and cross-examination of the child shall
proceed in the same manner as permitted at trial. The court shall make
certain that the defendant and defense counsel have adequate opportuni-
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trial court held a hearing to determine if the Commonwealth
could show good cause, as required under the Act, to allow the
children to avoid testifying before the Wife and Husband during
the trial.10 At the hearing, the parents of the children and a
child therapist stated that the children could not testify in open
court because they would become quiet and withdrawn in the
presence of the Wife and Husband and the jury.1 Despite ob-
jections from the Wife and Husband, the trial court found good
cause, as defined by the Act, and allowed the children to testify
by videotape or closed circuit television."
Following the ruling of the trial court, authorities videotaped
the testimony of each child at a local youth services agency with
the child, one parent, a court clerk, a stenographer, the defense
counsel, the district attorney and the trial judge present." The
ty to communicate for the purposes of providing an effective defense.
§ 5985. Testimony by closed-circuit television
(a) Closed-circuit television - The child victim or material witness,
through his parent or guardian, or, where applicable, the child's advo-
cate or the attorney for the Commonwealth may move, for good cause
shown, that the testimony of a child be taken in a room other than the
courtroom and televised by closed-circuit equipment to be viewed by the
court and the finder of fact in the proceeding. Only the attorneys for
the defendant and for the Commonwealth, the court reporter, the judge,
persons necessary to operate the equipment and any person whose pres-
ence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of the child, includ-
ing persons designated under section 5983 (relating to rights and servic-
es), may be present in the room with the child during his testimony.
The court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony
of the child in person but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see
the defendant. The court shall make certain that the defendant and
defense counsel have adequate opportunity to communicate for the pur-
poses of providing an effective defense. Examination and cross-exami-
nation of the child shall proceed in the same manner as permitted at
trial.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5984-85 (Supp. 1994). The Act did not specifically define good
cause, but rather took note of the fact that children have a more difficult time deal-
ing with the emotional impact of certain crimes than adults. Id. at §§ 5984-85.
10. Louden, 638 a2d at 954-55.
11. Id. at 955. The therapist, who was treating at least one of the child wit-
nesses, stated that the children would be hesitant to speak before strangers in a
court room setting. Id. Furthermore, the therapist believed that the presence of
strangers, especially in an adversarial proceeding where the defense would dispute
their opinions and statements, might make the children anxious. Id.
12. Id. The Wife testified that she saw several of the day care children at
monthly cub scout meetings and they did not exhibit any fear, hostility or anxiety
upon seeing her. Id. The opinion does not make it clear whether the "several chil-
dren" she referred to were the children who were to testify or other children who
attended the day care center. The Wife also requested that the trial court interview
the child witnesses individually to determine if they would be harmed by testifying
in open court. Id. The trial court denied her request. Id.
13. Id. The Wife and Husband, who were able to communicate with their at-
torneys during the testimony, were seated in an adjoining room and could observe
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Commonwealth played the videotapes for the jury during its
case-in-chief.1 ' The jury found the Wife and Husband guilty of
endangering the welfare of a child.1"
After the verdict, the Wife and Husband filed a motion in
arrest of judgment"6 and moved for a new trial.17 The trial
court agreed with the Wife and Husband's contentions that the
videotape procedures in the Act infringed upon their right to'
confront their accusers face-to-face and granted the couple a new
trial.1 Because the trial court declared an act of the General
Assembly unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
assumed appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the statute
allowing for videotape and closed circuit television testimony of
a material child witness outside the physical presence of the
accused, satisfied the accused's constitutional right to confront .a
witness face-to-face. 9
Justice Papadakos, writing for the court,' first stated the
controlling standard of review before the court addressed the
constitutionality of the Act." The court indicated that any piece
of legislation was granted a presumption of constitutionality
unless a challenger could show a clear, palpable and plain dem-
each child via closed circuit television. Id
14. Id.
15. Louden, 638 A-2d at 955.
16. An arrest of judgment is the act of staying a judgment, after verdict; for
some matter appearing on the face of the record which would render the judgment
erroneous or reversible. BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNARY 110 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Louden, 638 A.2d at 955.
18. Id. A defendant's right to confront a witness is established by both the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article I, sec-
tion 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that the accused "hath a right . . . to
meet the witnesses face to face." PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (emphasis added).
19. Louden, 638 A.2d at 955. Section 722(7) of the Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure Act grants the supreme court exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from the
final orders of trial courts holding a state statute unconstitutional. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 722(7) (1981).
20. Justice Papadakos delivered the opinion of the court. Justices Zappala and
Cappy joined the portion of the opinion concerning the constitutionality of the Act,
but Justice Zappala filed a dissent concerning the suppression of the tape recorded
evidence, in which Justice Cappy joined. Louden, 638 A.2d at 960-61. Chief Justice
Nix and Justice Flaherty joined the portion of the opinion concerning the suppres-
sion of the tape recorded evidence, but Justice Flaherty filed a dissent concerning
the constitutionality of the Act, in which Chief Justice Nix joined. Id. at 959-60.
Justices Larsen and McDermott did not participate in the decision of this case. Id.
at 959.
21. Id. at 956. In James v. SEPTA, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set
forth its standard of review when addressing the constitutionality of lawfully enacted
legislation. See James v. SEPTA, 477 A.2d 1302, 1304 (Pa. 1984).
Vol. 33:361'
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onstration that the statute violated a constitutional provision.'
Also, the court noted that in interpreting the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution, it was not required to follow the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretation of similar federal constitutional
issues.' On the contrary, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
could set forth more rigorous standards than those established
by the federal constitution."
In reviewing the trial court's determination that the videotape
and closed circuit television testimony provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional, the court relied on the decision in Common-
wealth v. Ludwig,' rendered three years earlier.' The court
found Ludwig factually similar to Louden and thus began its
analysis of the instant case by outlining the rules established in
Ludwig.'" In Ludwig, the court found that the Pennsylvania
Constitution required a face-to-face confrontation between a de-
fendant and witnesses, allowing exceptions only after the wit-
ness had previously testified before the defendant, and when the
defendant had the opportunity to face and ross-examine the witness.
2
8
22. Louden, 638 A.2d at 956 (quoting James, 477 A.2d at 1304).
23. Louden, 638 A.2d at 956. This assertion was critical to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's ability to set forth a unique standard based solely on the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. As the court noted, it has "the 'power to provide broader stan-
dards and go beyond the minimum floor which is established by the federal constitu-
tion.' " Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894 (Pa. 1991)).
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig did not
determine the outcome of this case. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). In
Craig, the Court upheld a Maryland statute, similar to Pennsylvania's, which al-
lowed the defendant to cross-examine the child and required an individualized find-
ing that the child needed special protection. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-57.
24. Louden, 638 A.2d at 956 (quoting Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d
887 (Pa. 1991)).
25. 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991). For a discussion of Ludwig see notes 72-79 and
accompanying text.
26. Louden, 638 A.2d at 956. Ludwig, which came before the court prior to
the enactment of the provisions addressed in Louden, involved the closed circuit
television testimony of a five-year-old victim of sexual assault. Ludwig, 594 ,.2d at
281-82. At the preliminary hearing, the young victim testified that she did not re-
member anything that occurred between herself and the defendant during the al-
leged assault. Id. at 282. After a psychologist testified that the victim experienced
emotional freezing, the trial court allowed the young girl to testify via closed circuit
television at another preliminary hearing and during the trial. Id. The child and her
foster mother were in a separate room during the testimony, linked to the judge,
the prosecutor, the defense counsel and the defendant by a microphone. Id. Follow-
ing the trial, the defendant was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate sexual inter-
course, incest, indecent assault, corrupting the morals of a minor and endangering
the welfare of a child. Id.
27. Louden, 638 A-2d at 956.
28. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 284. See also Commonwealth v. Russo, 131 A.2d 83,
88 (Pa. 1957). The Russo court provided a clear and convincing statement as to why
Pennsylvania required, rather than merely preferred, a face-to-face confrontation:
Many people possess the trait of being loose-tongued or willing to say some-
366 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 33:361
Once the court set forth the above rules, it applied them to
the case at bar." The court found that Sections 5984 and 5985
of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act failed to guarantee
that the defendant would have the ability to confront the wit-
ness face-to-face prior to the fact-finder receiving the testimo-
ny.s The court also noted that the clear intent of the legisla-
tion was to protect the welfare of the child witness."1 While rec-
ognizing the importance of protecting the welfare of the child
witness, the court reiterated that this interest did not outweigh
the right of a defendant to confront an accuser face-to-face.32
Accordingly, the supreme court declared that the videotape and
closed circuit television testimony provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional and upheld the trial court's decision to grant
the Wife and Husband a new trial."
Justice Flaherty, joined by Chief Justice Nix, filed a dissent-
thing behind a person's back that they dare not or cannot truthfully say to
his face or under oath in a courtroom. It was probably for this reason, as well
as to give the accused the right to cross-examine his accusers and thereby
enable the jury to better determine the credibility of the Commonwealth's
witnesses and the strength and truth of its case, that this important added
protection was given to every person accused of crime. We have no right to
disregard or (unintentionally) erode or distort any provision of the constitution,
especially where, as here, its plain and simple language make its meaning
unmistakably clear; indeed, because of the times in which we live, we have a
higher duty than ever before to zealously protect and safeguard the constitu-
tion.
Russo, 131 A.2d at 88.




33. Id. The opinion also addressed the separate issue of whether the trial
court properly suppressed Ms. Wolfe's tape recordings. Id. at 958. The supreme court
reversed the trial court's decision. Id. at 959. The supreme court noted that Section
5721(a) of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act states that an aggrieved
party may move to suppress the contents of an unlawfully intercepted wire, elec-
tronic or oral communication. Id. at 958 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5721(a) (1978
& Supp. 1994). The supreme court also asserted that Section 5702 of the Act defines
oral communication as '[alny oral communication uttered by a person possessing an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circum-
stances justifying such expectation." Louden, 638 A.2d at 958 (quoting 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5702).
The supreme court reasoned that once the communication taking place inside
the Wife and Husband's half of the house became audible inside the other half, the
Wife and Husband lost whatever expectation of privacy they had that their conversa-
tions would not be recorded. Louden, 638 A.2d at 959 (citing Commonwealth v.
Henlen, 564 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1989) and Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81 (Pa.
1988)). Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the conversations were not oral
communications protected under the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act and
reversed the trial court's holding to suppress the tape recordings. Louden, 638 A.2d
at 959.
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ing opinion to this portion of the decision." He stated that his
reasons for dissenting from this portion of the decision were the
same as those set forth in his dissenting opinion in Ludwig.'
In the Ludwig dissent, Justice Flaherty stated that closed circuit
television procedures, almost identical to the ones provided in
the Act, did not impede a defendant's ability to cross-examine
the witness, which he found to be the essence of the right of
confrontation guaranteed by the Constitutions of both the Unit-
ed States and Pennsylvania.' Finally, in his dissent filed in
the present case, Justice Flaherty noted that any statements
made by the court concerning the closed circuit television provi-
sions in Section 5985 were dictum, because only videotaped
testimony pursuant to Section 5984 was at issue in this case. 7
The history of a defendant's right to confront witnesses is
varied and complex.' Most litigation concerning the right in-
volves the admissibility of out-of-court statements rather than
the face-to-face confrontation element of the right.9 Case law
34. Louden, 638 A.2d at 959 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
35. Id. Justice Flaherty's dissent was only a paragraph long, and referred the
reader to his dissent in Ludwig. See Louden, 638 A.2d at 959 (Flaherty, J., dissent-
ing).
36. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 289 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Rather than requiring a
mere face-to-face confrontation, Justice Flaherty argued that the real intention of the
Confrontation Clause was to guarantee the reliability of testimony by subjecting it to
the adversarial process. Id. at 290.
The dissent further questioned the majority's reasoning that an exception to
a defendant's confrontation right existed only when there had been a previous face-
to-face encounter. Id. at 289. The opinion specifically noted that dying declarations,
excited utterances and statements of co-conspirators - exceptions to the hearsay
rule - were admitted into evidence despite the inability of the defendant to confront
or cross-examine the declarant. Id. Hearsay evidence is:
[T]estimony in court of a statement made out of the court, the statement
being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein,
and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court assert-
er . . . . The very nature of the evidence shows its weakness, and, as such,
hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls within one of the
many exceptions which provides for admissibility.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990)
37. Louden, 638 A.2d at 959 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Justice Zappala, joined
by Justice Cappy, filed a dissenting opinion to the disposition of the suppression
issue. Id. at 960 (Zappala, J., dissenting). Noting the sanctity of one's place of resi-
dence, Justice Zappala stated that the Wife and Husband held a reasonable expecta-
tion that the conversations taking place inside their house would be free from elec-
tronic surveillance no matter how audible their voices became. Id. (citing Common-
wealth v. Shaw, 383 &2d 496 (Pa. 1978)). Because of this reasonable expectation,
Justice Zappala agreed with the trial court's refusal to allow the Commonwealth to
introduce any tapes recorded by Ms. Wolfe. Louden, 638 A.2d at 961 (Zappala, J.,
dissenting).
38. See note 18 for the pertinent text of a defendant's confrontation right as
contained in both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
39. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (holding that an Iowa statute
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addressing the effect of videotape testimony on a defendant's
confrontation right is scarce, especially because videotape and
closed circuit television technology is relatively new. This note
first explores Pennsylvania precedent addressing the basic na-
ture of a defendant's confrontation right in order to lay a foun-
dation on how the courts view the right in general. The note
then addresses Pennsylvania case law concerning the more di-
rect issue of how testimony via videotape or closed circuit televi-
sion technology affects a defendant's confrontation rights.
Commonwealth v. Cleary'" was one of the first cases in which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted a defendant's con-
frontation right and the goals which that right was intended to
protect. The issue the court addressed was whether the Com-
monwealth could admit the testimony of an unavailable witness
from a previous trial over objections raised by the defendant
based on his confrontation rights."' Because the defendant was
in the presence of the witness and was able to cross-examine the
witness at the previous trial, the court held that admitting the
former testimony at the second trial did not violate his confron-
tation rights.' Although the court acknowledged that the right
of confrontation had a direct constitutional origin, the court
reasoned that the defendant's rights were not infringed when
the defendant had the opportunity to be face-to-face with and
cross-examine the witness in a previous legal proceeding.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided its next important
interpretation of a defendant's confrontation right in Common-
wealth v. Russo.' Russo involved a police officer who testified
at a magistrate's hearing that an individual solicited the officer
to commit sodomy.45 Subsequently, at the grand jury hearing,
permitting the placement of a screen between the defendant and a child sexual
assault victim during testimony violated the defendant's confrontation rights). In Coy,
the Court reasoned that there was a lack of case law on the face-to-face confronta-
tion aspect of the Sixth Amendment because there is very little doubt (and hence
very little litigation) that the literal meaning of the language required at least a
physical confrontation. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016.
40. 23 A. 1110 (Pa. 1892).
41. Cleary, 23 A. at 1111. The defendant originally had been convicted of first
degree murder, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed that judgment and
ordered a retrial. Id. at 1110. At the second trial, the trial court admitted the tran-
scribed testimony of Theodore McConnell, who had been examined at the former
trial and cross-examined by the defendant's counsel. Id. at 1111. At the start of the
second trial, McConnell no longer resided in Pennsylvania and was beyond the reach
of a subpoena. Id.
42. Id. at 1112.
43. Id.
44. 131 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1957).
45. Russo, 131 A.2d at 85. The officer was very precise in his testimony of the
Vol. 33:361
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the officer denied that the individual made any solicitation."
Due to this unexpected contradiction, the officer was indicted for
perjury; but before the officer's trial, the individual who made
the alleged solicitation could not be found.47 At the officer's per-
jury trial, the Commonwealth attempted to admit the transcript
of the individual's testimony at the magistrate's hearing in
which the individual admitted soliciting the officer." The trial
court admitted the evidence and the officer was convicted of
perjury.'
9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the perjury convic-
tion and held that the admission of the transcript violated the
officer's confrontation right." The court reasoned that because
the officer was not the individual accused at the magistrate's
hearing, the officer had not previously had the opportunity to
effectively confront or cross-examine the witness with regard to
the perjury indictment."'
Neither Cleary nor Russo involved allowing a witness to testi-
fy outside the physical presence of the defendant by means of
videotape or closed circuit television. 2 However, these cases are
evidence that the Pennsylvania courts vigorously protect a de-
fendant's confrontation right. The cases are also demonstrate
that the courts are willing to allow exceptions to the confronta-
tion right only when the defendant has had a previous opportu-
nity to confront and cross-examine the witness face-to-face.'
alleged solicitation, giving the exact time and location ofthe act. Id.
46. Id. Consequently, the grand jury did not have tafficient evidence to indict
the individual. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The portion of the transcript the Commonwealth wished to admit quot-
ed the individual as stating, "I admit to this." Id. Because the officer first testified
at the magistrate's hearing that the solicitation occurred and then later at the grand
jury hearing denied that the solicitation occurred, the individual's own admission
that the solicitation occurred would have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
officer committed peijury in his testimony before the grand jury. d.
49. Id. The superior court held that the transcript from the magistrate's hear-
ing was admissible and sustained the officer's conviction of perjury. Commonwealth
v. Russo, 111 A.2d 359 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955), rev'd, 131 A.2d 83 (Pa. 1957).
50. Russo, 131 A.2d at 87-88.
51. Id. at 88. Because the transcript of the individual's testimony at the
magistrate's hearing had to be excluded, the Commonwealth could not prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the officer committed perjury at the grand jury proceeding.
Id. In dicta, the court explained that the plain and simple language of the constitu-
tional right required that a defendant be able to physically confront an accuser. Id.
See note 28 for the full text of the court's statement.
52. See Russo, 131 A.2d at 83 (explaining that a defendant's right to physical-
ly confront accusers was an important constitutional right); Cleary, 23 A. at 1110
(holding that admitting prior testimony of a witness at a subsequent trial did not
violate a defendant's right of confrontation where the defendant had a previous op-
portunity to confront the witness).
53. See Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 372 A.2d 771, 779 (Pa. 1977) (holding that
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Only recently have Pennsylvania courts been presented with
the unique problems that videotape and television technology
present in the area of court room testimony. In Commonwealth
v. Stasko,s' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was first con-
fronted with the admission into evidence of a videotaped deposi-
tion of a witness who could not testify in court due to the emo-
tional strain of the trial.' The defendant in Stasko complained
that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by admitting
the videotaped deposition at trial." The court ruled that admit-
ting the videotaped deposition did not violate the defendant's
confrontation right.5" The court noted that the defendant and
his counsel were present during the videotaped deposition and
had full opportunity to confront and cross-examine the wit-
ness.' In this case, the court allowed the videotaped testimony
to replace in-court testimony because there had been a previous
face-to-face encounter between the witness and the defendant
even though it did not take place in the court room."
In 1986, Pennsylvania passed a statute providing for video-
tape or closed circuit television testimony of child witnesses.'
Sections 5984 and 5985 of the Child Victims and Witnesses Act
provided that in any prosecution involving a child victim or
testimony which an unavailable witness gave at a preliminary hearing was admissi-
ble at trial if the defendant had counsel and a full opportunity to cross-examine the
witness during the hearing); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 35 A.2d 312, 314 (Pa. 1944)
(holding that the use of statements of witnesses outside the presence of the defend-
ant to determine the sentence on a conviction of first degree murder violated the de-
fendant's confrontation rights); Commonwealth v. Lenousky, 55 A. 977, 978 (Pa.
1903) (holding that admitting the transcript of an absent witness given at a prelimi-
nary hearing violated a defendant's confrontation right where the defendant was not
represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing and was not notified of his right
to cross-examine); Commonwealth v. Keck, 24 A. 161, 161 (Pa. 1892) (holding that
where an eyewitness to a homicide testified at the preliminary hearing in the de-
fendant's presence, was cross-examined by the defendant's counsel, and died before
trial, the transcript of his testimony was admissible over the defendant's contention
that it violated the right of confrontation).
54. 370 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1977).
55. Stasko, 370 k2d at 352-53. Stasko involved a defendant convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder in the stabbing death of his former girlfriend. Id. at 352. The
trial court permitted an eyewitness to the crime to testify by means of a videotaped
deposition after her physician stated that the emotional strain of the trial would ag-
gravate several medical conditions. Id. at 353.
56. Id. The deposition was taken less than two weeks before the trial and in
the presence of the trial judge, the defendant, his attorney and an assistant district
attorney. Id.
57. Id. at 355.
58.- Id.
59. Id.
60. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5981-88 (Supp. 1994). See note 9 for the pertinent
provisions of the Act.
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material witness, the court could allow the child to testify via
videotaped depositions or closed circuit television upon a finding
of good cause. 1 During either the videotape or closed circuit
television procedure, the only persons allowed in the room with
the child were the attorneys for the Commonwealth and the de-
fendant, the people necessary to operate the equipment, a court
reporter and any person who would have contributed to the well-
being of the child. 2 The Act allowed the defendant the opportu-
nity to observe and hear the child, but required that the child
not be able to hear or see the defendant." The Act was part of
a nationwide effort in the mid-1980s to shield alleged child
abuse victims from further harm while participating in the crim-
inal justice process." By 1990, thirty-seven states allowed child
sex abuse victims to testify via videotape, twenty-four states
passed laws allowing the use of one-way closed circuit television
testimony and eight states authorized the use of two-way closed
circuit television testimony.'
Not more than a year after the Pennsylvania legislature
passed the Child Victims and Witnesses Act, defendants began
attacking the constitutionality of the statute based on the explic-
it Pennsylvania Constitutional right to confront accusers face-to-
face." From 1987 through 1990, Pennsylvania's lower courts
upheld the constitutionality of the statute, relying primarily on
61. 42 PA CONS. STAT. §§ 5984-85. The Act did not specifically define good
cause but rather took note of the fact that children have a more difficult time than
adults in dealing with the emotional impact of certain crimes. id. The Act defined
children as individuals under 14 years of age. Id. at § 5982. In the case of an indi-
vidual from 14 to 15 years of age, the Act included a rebuttable presumption that
the individual would benefit from the videotape or closed circuit television proce-
dures. Id. In the case of an individual from 16 to 17 years of age, there was a




64. See, e.g., Theresa Cusick, Note, Televised Justice: Toward a New Definition
of Confrontation Under Maryland v. Craig, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 967, 968-69 (1991).
The state statutes that the respective legislatures passed in an effort to protect child
victims came in various forms, but most allowed child witnesses to testify via closed
circuit television or videotaped depositions. Id. Some also created a new hearsay
exception, allowing a child's out-of-court statements to be admitted as substantive
evidence. Id. at 968.
65. Cusick, cited at note 64, at 968-69 n.15.
66. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 576 A-2d 1005, 1012 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
rev'd, 615 A-2d 732 (Pa. 1992), (holding that a defendant's right of confrontation was
not violated when a child witness was permitted to testify via closed circuit televi-
sion upon an individualized finding of special need); In Re Borden, 546 A.2d 123,
124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (permitting a juvenile to listen to and see the alleged
victim's testimony through closed circuit television did not violate the juvenile's con-
stitutional right of confrontation).
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the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness despite the
lack of a physical confrontation.
In Commonwealth v. Davis,'7 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court upheld a conviction of first-degree murder where the de-
fendant's five-year-old daughter, the only eyewitness to the
crime, testified during the trial via closed circuit television.6
The trial occurred more than a year after the crime, and al-
though a psychologist testified that the child had made signifi-
cant progress in coping with the emotional trauma of witnessing
her mother's violent death, the child became silent when asked
about her mother's murder at the trial. 9 Due to the child's re-
action, the trial court permitted the child to testify via closed cir-
cuit television as stipulated by the Act."0 The superior court
upheld the use of the closed circuit television because the record
clearly showed that the trial court made an individualized find-
ing of good cause, as required by the Act, to allow the child to
testify outside the presence of the defendant.7'
In 1991, in Commonwealth v. Ludwig," the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of allowing a child
witness to testify via videotape or closed circuit television out-
side of the physical presence of a defendant.73 Ludwig involved
a five-year-old victim of sexual assault who experienced emotion-
67. 576 A.2d 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), rev'd, 615 A.2d 732 (Pa. 1992). This
decision was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the basis of Common-
wealth v. Ludwig. Davis, 615 A.2d at 732 (citing Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594
A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991)).
68. Davis, 576 A.2d at 1010. In the early morning hours of April 27, 1987, the
defendant entered the apartment of the victim, his estranged girlfriend and mother
of two of his children. Id. at 1007. The defendant shot the victim once in the face
and twice in the back of the head. Id. The five-year-old child witnessed all three
shots. Id.
69. Id. at 1012. The trial court repeatedly postponed her testimony, ordering
several recesses, so the child could take long walks with a social worker in order to
calm her down. Id. The only testimony the child could offer in the presence of her
father was that she told the truth during the preliminary hearing, that she did not
want to answer any more questions and that she did not want to "see her daddy."
Id.
70. Id. The child, together with her grandmother and a social worker, entered
a room adjacent to the court room where she was able to view on a color monitor
the trial court, the defense counsel and the prosecutor while they posed questions.
Id. at 1010. Another color monitor transmitted the child's testimony into the court
room. Id.
71. Id. at 1011.
72. 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
73. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 281. In Ludwig, the court was not reviewing the
constitutionality of the Act in question in Louden because Ludwig was at trial prior
to the enactment of the Act. Furthermore, the trial court was relying on its own
discretion in utilizing the televised testimony procedures because there was no legis-
lation in effect at the time.
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al freeze at trial and was unable to testify about prior incidents
she had discussed during the preliminary hearing.74 The trial
court permitted the child to testify via closed circuit televi-
sion." The Ludwig court held that the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion required a face-to-face confrontation, allowing exceptions
only when the defendant had previously confronted and cross-
examined the witness."' The court recognized the importance of
society's interest in protecting the welfare of sexually abused
children.77 However, the court asserted that the subjective fears
of a witness, without more, was not as important as the defend-
ant's right to confront accusers.78 Because the closed circuit
television procedure used in Ludwig did not afford the defendant
the ability to physically confront and cross examine the child,
the court concluded that the procedure was unconstitutional."
On the same day as its decision in Ludwig, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Lohman,s" a case
factually similar to Ludwig. The defendant in Lohman was
charged with raping his fourteen-year-old step-daughter and
committing involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and incest
with his fourteen-year-old son.8 At the rape trial, the step-
daughter testified in the judge's chambers in the presence of the
judge, the defense attorney and the prosecuting attorney; her
testimony was transmitted via a television monitor to the jury in
the court room."2 The defendant's son testified in an identical
fashion at the second trial." The court merely cited to Ludwig
in holding that the provisions followed in both trials violated the
defendant's confrontation right because the procedures did not
allow the defendant to physically confront and fully cross-exam-
ine the witnesses.8'
In light of Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, the
Louden decision was not surprising. The only real distinction
74. Id. at 282.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 284.
77. Id. at 285.
78. Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 285.
79. Id. at 282.
80. 594 A.2d 291 (Pa. 1991). Lohman was also at trial prior to enactment of
the Act at issue in Louden, and the trial court relied on its own discretion in using
televised testimony provisions.
81. Lohman, 594 A.2d at 291.
82. Id The trial court permitted the girl to testify in this manner solely on
the basis that she was reluctant to testify against the defendant. Id.
83. Id. at 291-92. At both trials, the defendant was sequestered in another
room, of which the jury was not aware, and was able to communicate with his at-
torney by a direct telephone line. Id. at 291.
84. Id. at 292.
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between Ludwig and Louden is one of timing - the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court decided Ludwig prior to the enactment of the
Child Victim and Witnesses Act at issue in Louden. The two
cases were nearly identical; virtually the same videotape and
closed circuit television procedures were used in each case to aid
child Witnesses. After Ludwig, it was only a matter of time be-
fore the court applied the same reasoning to declare the Child
Victims and Witnesses Act unconstitutional.'M
In Louden as in Ludwig, the court was basically asked which
interest it found more important - allowing children to testify
about acts of abuse without facing their alleged abusers, or al-
lowing defendants to physically confront those who accuse them
of committing serious crimes. The court was confronted with a
difficult issue, especially in light of the horrific crimes some
adults commit against children. However, it is this author's
opinion that the court correctly decided in favor of the defend-
ant's right to physically confront a witness if the defendant has
not had a previous opportunity to face and cross-examine the
witness. This basic constitutional right should take precedent
over the public policy interest in protecting children from facing
alleged abusers.
The proponents of allowing children to testify outside the
physical presence of alleged abusers, including the dissenters in
Louden, base their reasoning primarily on the various hearsay
exceptions that do not afford a defendant the prior ability to
physically confront or cross-examine a witness."s The hearsay
exceptions these advocates point to, which include statements of
co-conspirators, excited utterances and dying declarations, are
all premised upon circumstances assuring the reliability and
trustworthiness of a statement. 7 A number of questions arise,
however, regarding the true reliability and trustworthiness of
testimony obtained from children through means of videotape or
closed circuit television technology.
Current research shows that the presence of the alleged abus-
er may not be the only factor causing emotional stress to chil-
dren who testify during a court proceeding."M Physical charac-
85. See Ludwig, 594 A.2d at 282. The court noted that the legislature adopted
the Act in question in Louden after the trial in Ludwig. Id. at 282 n.2. For this
reason, the court had to wait for another day to decide on the constitutionality of
the Act. Id.
86. Louden, 638 A.2d at 959 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). See Ludwig, 594 A.2d
at 289 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
87. See FEn. R. EVID. 801(dX2XE), 803(2), 804(bX2).
88. See Robert H. King, Jr., The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution:
Should the Bill of Rights Be Transformed Into the Bill of Preferences?, 53 OHIO ST.
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teristics of the courtroom such as the size of the witness chair
and the use of microphones, in addition to the lengthy delays of
the criminal process and the need to testify a multitude of times
are more important factors in causing emotional trauma to chil-
dren than the presence of the alleged abuser.' If this is the
case, erasing the defendant's right to confront accusers would be
a serious and unjustified mistake.
The danger also exists that the jury will place too much reli-
ance on the child's testimony. In this age of television culture,
studies have tended to show that many viewers perceive what
they see on television as accurate." Also, the jury could miss
substantial portions of evidence during the actual examination
process that could contribute to a false sense of accuracy. Chil-
dren could interpret a casual nod or smile from a parent or dis-
trict attorney, something the jury would never be able to detect,
as an indication of a "correct" answer and to continue answering
along the same line."'
Furthermore, allowing the child to be separated from the
alleged abuser and to testify via videotape or closed circuit tele-
vision undermines the defendant's presumption of innocence.
The jury could prematurely determine that there can only be
one reason to separate the defendant and the child - the de-
fendant is guilty. 2 This logical, but extremely unfair assump-
tion could not be effectively erased by even the most strenuous
of instructions to do otherwise.
After Louden there are no unresolved issues regarding the use
of videotape or closed circuit television outside the presence of
the defendant. It is constitutionally impermissible unless the de-
fendant has had a previous opportunity to physically confront
and cross-examine the child witness.93
No one would argue with the fact that protecting children
from emotional trauma during court testimony is an important
interest. However, there are ways to achieve this goal without
infringing upon a defendant's right to physically confront accus-
ers. In light of the studies previously mentioned, assuring a
L.J. 49 (1992).
89. King, cited at note 88, at 90-91.
90. See Charles E. Wilson, Jr., Presumed Guilty: The Use of Videotaped and
Closed-Circuit Televised Testimony in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions and the Defend-
ant's Right to Confrontation, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 381, 390 (1989) (citing various
studies that show viewers believe what they see on television is accurate and unbi-
ased).
91. Wilson, cited at note 90, at 389.
92. King, cited at note 88, at 97.
93. Louden, 638 A.2d at 957.
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speedy trial could prevent children from experiencing trauma
due to lengthy trials and repetitive testimony. Making court-
rooms more "friendly" to children and more familiar to the child
psyche, such as smaller chairs, special child witness stands and
different decor, could ease the tension a child feels while testify-
ing during a court proceeding. Finally, courts could use a special
"child interpreter" to pose questions from both counsel in lan-
guage understood by children.'
The above suggestions could greatly reduce the anxiety that
children experience during live, in-court testimony while at the
same time preserving the defendant's important right to physi-
cally confront all witnesses that testify during a trial.
Michael L. Bell
94. Wilson, cited at note 90, at 393-95. The author explains in more detail
how these various measures could accomplish the important goal of protecting chil-
dren without having to trample the rights of defendant's accused of serious crimes.
Id.
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